(b) USTR's discretion not to take action

4.967 The United States recalls that under Section 301(a)(1), upon a determination that US rights under a trade agreement have been denied,

"the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection (c) of this section, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the President may direct the Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.

Actions may be taken that are within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign country".⁴⁶⁶

4.968  The United States explains that Section 301(c) authorizes the USTR to act against goods or services or to enter into agreements to eliminate the violation of US agreement rights or to receive compensation for those violations.⁴⁶⁷ It does not mandate any particular form of action.

4.969  The United States further states that with respect to action taken under Section 301, the USTR has substantial discretion, including discretion to take no action at all. The USTR is explicitly not required to take action: (1) when the DSB has adopted report findings that US rights have not been violated;⁴⁶⁸ (2) when the foreign country "is taking satisfactory measures to grant the rights of the United States under a trade agreement",⁴⁶⁹ has agreed to eliminate or phase out the practice which violated US rights,⁴⁷⁰ or has agreed to provide compensation;⁴⁷¹ (3) when action would have "an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of proportion to the benefits of such action;"⁴⁷² (4) or when action would cause "serious harm to [US] national security".⁴⁷³ The European Communities has acknowledged that when WTO Members commit to implement DSB recommendations within the time period foreseen in DSB Article 21, the United States has considered this a "satisfactory measure " justifying termination of an investigation without further action.

4.970  In response to the Panel's question, the United States explains that Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i) allows the USTR to take no action if the foreign country is taking "satisfactory measures to grant the rights of the United States under a trade agreement". In all of the scenarios presented in the question – DSB recommendations not yet adopted, suspension of concessions not yet authorized, the Member concerned has not expressed an intention to comply and has decided not to do anything before the expiration of the reasonable period of time – the continued participation of the Member concerned in dispute settlement proceedings would constitute satisfactory measures to grant US agreement rights. It is important to recognise that the rights in question would not necessarily be the substantive rights the Member had been denying through its challenged measure, but, rather, US WTO rights under DSU Articles 21 - 23. For example, if the Member concerned had failed to express its intention to implement DSB recommendations, or was choosing not to use the reasonable period of time to implement, this would ultimately result in the United States obtaining the right to compensation or to suspend concessions pursuant to DSU Article 22.2. The United States could on this basis determine not to take action pursuant to Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i).

4.971  In the view of the United States, the European Communities disregards entirely provisions of Section 301(a)(2) which provide the USTR and the President with discretion to limit any action to that authorized by the DSB, or to take no action at all. These include explicit authority not to take action when the DSB adopts findings that US agreement rights are not being denied or that US trade agreement benefits are not being nullified or impaired. In other words, the USTR may limit or take no action depending on the outcome of Article 22 proceedings. In addition, the USTR may choose not to take action for reasons of national security, if the action has an adverse economic impact or if the USTR is satisfied that satisfactory measures are being taken to grant US agreement rights. Finally, actions taken under Section 301(a) are subject to "the specific direction, if any, of the President".  The President may also place conditions on any action taken or direct that action not be taken.

4.972  In response to the Panel's question as to whether the sole fact that DSB recommendations have not yet been adopted or that the DSB has not yet authorized the suspension of concessions can mean that USTR action in these circumstances would "have an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of proportion to the benefits of such action" or "cause serious harm to the national security of the United States", the United States indicates that given the broad discretion she has under Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i), the USTR might not consider it necessary to rely on these two provisions, though they could be available depending on the particular circumstances of a given case.

4.973  The United States further argues that a third reason the EC's argument fails is that any action the USTR may consider under Section 306(b) is taken pursuant to Section 301(a)(1), and is therefore subject to the exceptions to action set forth in Section 301(a)(2). The most important of these from the perspective of the current proceeding is Section 301(a)(2)(A), which provides that the USTR need not take action in any case in which the DSB has adopted a report or ruling finding that US agreement rights are not being denied or that US trade agreement benefits are not being nullified or impaired.⁴⁷⁴ The USTR is therefore free to take no action if an Article 22 arbitrator concludes that there is no nullification or impairment of US agreement benefits (i.e, that the other Member has complied with DSB recommendations), or to reduce the proposed level of suspension if the arbitrator concludes that the proposal exceeds the actual level of nullification or impairment. Other exceptions under Section 302(a)(2) which would ensure a WTO-consistent outcome (since no action would be taken) include exceptions when the USTR finds that action would have an adverse impact on the United States economy or would cause serious harm to national security.⁴⁷⁵

4.974  The United States claims that again, the European Communities case rests on an extensive string of unsupported assumptions. The EC assumption is that the USTR will always conclude that another Member has failed to implement DSB recommendations and rulings and that the United States must therefore take action. There is absolutely no basis in Section 306 for this conclusion. The USTR enjoys more than adequate discretion under Section 306 not to take action either because she considers that there has been full implementation, or because she considers that further dispute settlement proceedings are necessary to achieve such implementation. Section 306(b) therefore does not mandate that action be taken. In the absence of such action, there can be no violation of Article 23.2(c). The time frames in Section 305 never become relevant.

4.975  The United States argues that Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) and Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i), (iv) and (v) provide the USTR with broad discretion to delay or not take action, a fact explained in the Statement of Administrative Action on page 360.⁴⁷⁶ There it is explained that, "section 301 does not automatically require the imposition of sanctions where the United States wins a dispute settlement case under a trade agreement". The USTR may delay action under Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) if she has determined that "substantial progress is being made" or if the delay is necessary to obtain US rights or a satisfactory solution. Likewise, Sections 301(a)(2)(B)(i), (iv) and (v) permit no action to be taken if a foreign country is taking satisfactory measures to grant US agreement rights, if there would be an adverse economic impact, or for reasons of national security. The provisions of Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) and Section 302(a)(2)(B)(i) are particularly broad, since they are available based on the USTR's judgment that progress is being made, or that delay is necessary to achieve such progress.

4.976  The United States notes that Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) has been used on at least 3 occasions relating to GATT and WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Two of these, involving Korean – Beef and EC – Oilseeds. In addition, the USTR used Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) in December 1991, to delay implementation of action in an investigation involving Canadian import restrictions on beer. Based on an adopted GATT panel report finding Canadian violations, the USTR determined on December 27, 1991 that Canada had denied US rights under a trade agreement, and proposed increased duties on Canadian beer. However, the USTR determined, pursuant to Section 305(a)(2), that "it was desirable to delay implementation of action … in order to provide Canada with a full opportunity to comply with the recommendations of the GATT panel".⁴⁷⁷

4.977  The United States further points out that Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i) has also been used on several occasions. These include situations in which a WTO Member has stated its intention to comply with DSB rulings and recommendations (EC – Bananas III, Canada – Periodicals, India – Patents (US), Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (US)), situations in which a country has committed to implement GATT panel proceedings (EC Canned Fruit, EC – Oilseeds), and situations in which a country has confirmed that it would take measures to implement an earlier agreement (China Intellectual Property Rights).

(c) Discretion with respect to timing of action

4.978  The United States considers that the European Communities has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Sections 306(b) and 305(a) mandate any violation of DSU Article 23.2(c). The European Communities may not establish its claim that Section 306(b) mandates suspension of concessions without DSB authorization based on unsupported assumptions concerning how, and when, she will make decisions in a particular case. The European Communities may not meet its burden by assuming or asserting that the USTR must consider non-implementation to have occurred, or that it is permissible under US law to disregard entire statutory provisions which give the USTR and the President broad discretion to delay action, or to take no action at all. Section 306(b) permits the USTR to follow Article 22 procedures in every case.

4.979  The United States argues that there have now been two situations in which the European Communities has failed to implement DSB rulings and recommendations, and the United States as well as other WTO Members are gaining experience in this regard. The United States refers the Panel to US Exhibit 17, a Federal Register notice issued in connection with the Hormones dispute which describes in detail the manner in which the United States follows Article 22 procedures when exercising its authority under Section 306.

4.980  The United States further argues that even in those cases in which the USTR and President have determined that action will be taken, the time frames provided for in Sections 301-310 ensure that such action may await DSB authorization. Section 305(a)(1) provides,

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Trade Representative shall implement the action the Trade Representative determines under section 304(a)(1)(B) to take under section 301, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action, by no later than the date that is 30 days after the date on which such determination is made.⁴⁷⁸

4.981  In the view of the United States, Paragraph 2 of Section 305 provides that the 30-day period set forth in paragraph (1) may be extended for an additional 180 days:

(2) (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the Trade Representative may delay, by not more than 180 days, the implementation of any action that is to be taken under section 301 -

             .  .  .

(ii) if the Trade Representative determines that substantial progress is being made, or that a delay is necessary or desirable, to obtain United States rights or a satisfactory solution with respect to the acts, policies, or practices that are the subject of the action.⁴⁷⁹

4.982  The United States then concludes that Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) thus explicitly authorizes the USTR to delay action beyond the 30 days provided for in Section 305(a)(1) in order "to obtain U.S. rights", among other reasons. This would include rights under international agreements such as the GATT or other WTO agreements. The USTR has, in fact, exercised her discretion under Section 305(a)(2)(A) to delay action for just this purpose. On May 24, 1989, a GATT panel issued a report finding that Korea's import restrictions on beef were inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947.⁴⁸⁰ However, at meetings of the GATT Council on June 21 and July 19, 1989, Korea declined to agree to adoption of the panel report. USTR's time frame for action pursuant to Section 305(a)(1) was October 28, 1989. Nevertheless, citing Section 305(a)(2), the USTR determined that "a delay in implementation of such action is necessary and desirable to obtain U.S. rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade".⁴⁸¹ The USTR further explained that the delay in action beyond October 28, 1989 was desirable "to allow additional time for proceedings in the GATT".⁴⁸² Korea allowed the panel report to be adopted on November 8, 1989, and the United States and Korea initialed an agreement on implementation on March 21, 1990.⁴⁸³

4.983  The United States further explains that similarly, in the 1989 dispute between the United States and the European Communities over oilseeds, the USTR delayed action for 180 days pursuant to Section 305(a)(2)(A)(ii) on the basis that substantial progress was being made in GATT dispute panel proceedings which had not yet finished as of the 18-month target date.⁴⁸⁴ Moreover, the USTR specifically waited until after panel proceedings had finished before determining that US agreement rights had been denied under Section 304(a)(1)(A)(i), even though this was well after the 18-month target.⁴⁸⁵ Thus, it was consistent US practice, even before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, to rely on dispute settlement results when determining whether US agreement rights were denied.

4.984  The United States then indicates that the USTR and the President thus have broad discretion under Sections 301-310 to dictate the timing of any action, the conditions under which the action will be given effect, and whether the action will be taken at all. The USTR or the President may, for example, specify that any action taken should not become effective until the United States has received formal DSB approval.

4.985  The United States argues that when a WTO Member has indicated, pursuant to DSU Article 21.3, that it intends to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a case involving violations of US WTO rights, the USTR has considered this a "satisfactory measure" pursuant to Section 301(a)(2)(B) justifying termination of a Section 302 investigation.⁴⁸⁶ In such cases, the USTR continues to monitor the Member's implementation of the DSB rulings and recommendations pursuant to Section 306(a).⁴⁸⁷

4.986  The United States notes that in those cases in which the USTR considers that a WTO Member has not implemented DSB rulings and recommendations by the conclusion of the reasonable period of time provided for in Article 21.3, the USTR determines what further action she will take pursuant to Section 301(a).⁴⁸⁸ Contrary to the representation of the European Communities, the further action the USTR will take is subject to the specific direction of the President, since that action is taken pursuant to Section 301(a).⁴⁸⁹ Moreover, because the action is taken under Section 301(a), it is subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 301(a)(2) relating to, among other things, conformity with DSB-adopted reports, the adverse impact of such action on the US economy or its harm to US national security.⁴⁹⁰

4.987  The United States further argues that just as importantly, because the determination regarding the action to be taken is considered a determination under Section 304(a)(1),⁴⁹¹ the time frames for implementing the action are those set forth in Section 305. As described above, under Section 305, the action must be implemented within 30 days of the determination to take action, unless the USTR,

"determines that substantial progress is being made, or that a delay is necessary or desirable to obtain United States rights or satisfactory solution…".⁴⁹²

4.988  The United States maintains that in such cases, the USTR may delay action by a further 180 days. This permits the USTR to delay any action until well beyond the time frames required for DSB authorization for the right to suspend concessions pursuant to DSU Articles 22.6 or 22.7.

4.989  The United States challenges the EC assumption that, under US law, it is permissible to ignore entire statutory provisions. Specifically, in claiming that Section 305(a) requires action to be taken within 60 days of the expiration of the reasonable period of time, the European Communities completely disregards explicit statutory language authorizing the USTR to delay action by 180 days. Section 305(a)(2) authorizes the USTR to implement such a delay to obtain US rights or a satisfactory solution to the dispute. The United States used this provision to delay action until it was able to obtain rights under GATT 1947 dispute settlement procedures, and the European Communities has offered no explanation of why, under US law, the United States would not again be able to use this provision to delay action in order to first obtain DSB authorization.

4.990  The United States recalls that the European Communities has at times argued that the time frames in the DSU and Sections 301-310 are relevant to the above issues, and at other times that they are not. The United States indicates that the time frames in Sections 301-310 comport with those in the DSU, but even if they did not, it would not matter.  For example, even if panel proceedings were to exceed 18 months, the USTR would not be obligated to make the one determination that is an absolute prerequisite before any other requirements under Article 23.2(a) become relevant.   The USTR is not obligated to determine that US agreement rights have been denied.  The record shows that the USTR has never once made a Section 304(a)(1) determination that US GATT or WTO agreement rights have been denied which was not based on the results of GATT and WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  Not once.

4.991  The United States recalls that the European Communities now claims that the United States violates "Article 23" by virtue of the "retaliation list" Korea asserts the USTR must publish.  The EC's response to this question repeats many of its previous false assumptions, and adds to them the erroneous assumption that in providing for a determination of "action", Section 304(a)(1) requires publication of a list of products for which the United States is requesting suspension.

4.992  The United States points out that the USTR is not required to publish a "retaliation list" under Sections 301-310, and only Sections 301-310 are within the Panel's term's of reference.  In the event of an affirmative determination that US agreement rights have been denied, she is required, pursuant to Section 304(a)(1)(B), to determine what action to take.  This need not include publication of a proposed list of products subject to suspension of concessions.   The European Communities may not assume that it does.

4.993  The United States considers that public notice concerning which products might be the subject of a suspension of concessions is both good public policy and important to the effective exercise of WTO rights.  It is good public policy because importers and the public generally need to understand the actions the US government is proposing so they can comment, and because the government needs to receive public input in order to evaluate whether action is appropriate, if the action is to be taken under Section 301(b), or whether an exception under Section 301(a)(2) is applicable, if the action is to be taken under Section 301(a). The government also needs this information to apply the principles and procedures in DSU Article 22.3. For example, the United States must evaluate whether suspension of concessions within the same sector would be "practicable or effective" for purposes of undertaking the analysis called for in DSU Article 22.3. Public input is required to ensure that officials have the information necessary to make this judgment.

4.994  The United States notes that Canada, as well, publishes lists of products which might be the subject of a suspension of concessions in connection with Article 22 proceedings. US Exhibit 19 includes Canadian press releases describing and reproducing the proposed list of products Canada has published in the EC Hormones and Australia Salmon disputes. This reinforces the fact that such lists are an integral part of domestic implementation of Article 22. Until its answer to a Panel question, the European Communities had not claimed that such lists are inconsistent with the DSU. In fact, in the DSU Review, it now appears that the European Communities is insisting that such lists be offered at the time suspension is proposed.⁴⁹³

4.995 In the view of the United States, the European Communities merely asserts that Section 304 requires publication of a list of products, despite the absence of any textual basis for that assertion. It states that the USTR must either propose suspension of concessions or reach an agreement with the foreign country. According to the European Communities, if suspension is proposed, this necessarily includes publication of a list of products, but it fails to explain why this so, or if it is so, what the timing must be.⁴⁹⁴

4.996 The United States considers that leaving aside whether a list must be issued when suspension of concessions is proposed, the EC's description of the options available to the USTR (suspension or agreement) itself makes clear that suspension is not the only choice available. It therefore may not be concluded that suspension is mandated. Moreover, the USTR is not obliged to take any action at all. The European Communities again assumes it may ignore Section 301(a)(2), which allows the USTR to take no action if, among other reasons, she believes the foreign country is taking satisfactory measures to grant US trade rights, or if WTO dispute settlement proceedings result in a finding that US agreement rights have not been denied or benefits under a trade agreement have not been impaired. As a result, the USTR is never obligated to take action at odds with the results of WTO dispute settlement panels or arbitrators.

4.997 The United States claims that the USTR considers dispute settlement proceedings to conclude up to 30 days after adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports, a date which allows defending parties to state their intentions with regard to implementation. Thus, the USTR has typically issued her determination regarding denial of US trade agreement rights together with the determination that the foreign country is taking satisfactory measures.⁴⁹⁵ In fact, the USTR has even determined that a foreign country is taking satisfactory measures solely on the basis that she "expected" that country would implement DSB rulings and recommendations – without regard to whether it had actually informed the DSB of its intentions.⁴⁹⁶ Thus, the other half of the premise underlying Korea's argument is also incorrect, namely, that the time frames in Section 301 and 304, combined with the alleged requirement to publish a list, means that the list must be published before a losing party has had an opportunity to state its intentions with respect to implementation.

4.998 The United States argues that even were the European Communities permitted to assume that Section 304(a)(1) mandates the publication of a list of products for which the US is proposing suspension, it has failed to explain exactly how this violates Article 23. The European Communities does not even specify which paragraph of Article 23 publication of a list would violate. Instead, it merely characterizes publication as a "unilateral determination" which one must assume violates Article 23. This exemplifies the EC's flight from the text of the DSU in favor of its generalized approach of divining obligations from slogans.

4.999 In the US view, while it is difficult to respond to the EC's vague claims that the publication of a list of products proposed for suspension would violate Article 23, the mere fact that such lists are not mandated under Sections 301-310 (or even mentioned therein) precludes any finding of WTO inconsistency. The EC's arguments in response to Panel question 20 provide yet another example of how the European Communities is asking this Panel to make adverse assumptions concerning how the United States will exercise discretion under Sections 301-310. If the European Communities believes that publication of a list of products proposed for suspension would violate US WTO obligations, the European Communities should wait until the United States actually publishes such a list in a concrete case. Then, it would be in a position to argue from facts, not assumptions.

TO CONTINUE WITH UNITED STATES – SECTIONS 301-310 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974

⁴⁶⁶ Section 301(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(1) (emphasis added).

⁴⁶⁷ Section 301(c), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(c).

⁴⁶⁸ Section 301(a)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(A).

⁴⁶⁹ Section 301(a)(2)(B)(i), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(i).

⁴⁷⁰ Section 301(a)(2)(B)(ii), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii).

⁴⁷¹ Section 301(a)(2)(B)(iii), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(iii).

⁴⁷² Section 301(a)(2)(B)(iv), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv).

⁴⁷³ Section 301(a)(2)(B)(v), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(v).

⁴⁷⁴ Section 301(a)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(A).

⁴⁷⁵ Section 301(a)(2)(B)(iv), (v), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv), (v).

⁴⁷⁶  US Exhibits 3 and 11

⁴⁷⁷ The United States cites Notice of Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974: Canadian Provincial Practices Affecting Imports of Beer, 57 Fed. Reg. 308, 309 (1992).

⁴⁷⁸ Section 305(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. � 2415(a)(1).

⁴⁷⁹ Section 305(a)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. � 2415(a)(2)(A).

⁴⁸⁰ Panel Report on Korea – Beef, op. cit.

⁴⁸¹ Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, Regarding the Republic of Korea's Restrictions on Imports of Beef, 54 Fed. Reg. 40769 (1989) (US Exhibit 4).

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ See Termination of Section 302 Investigation Regarding the Republic of Korea's Restrictions on Imports of Beef, 55 Fed. Reg. 20376 (1990) (US Exhibit 5).

⁴⁸⁴ See Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended:  European Community Policies and Practices With Respect to, Inter Alia, Production and Processing Subsidies on Oilseeds, 55 Fed. Reg. 4294 (1990) (US Exhibit 6)

⁴⁸⁵ See ibid.  The United States notes that on the 18-month anniversary, the USTR instead concluded that she had reason to believe agreement rights were being denied, and therefore was pursuing such a ruling under GATT dispute settlement procedures.

⁴⁸⁶ E.g. Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 With Respect to Certain Canadian Practices Affecting Periodicals, 62 Fed. Reg. 50651 (1997) (US Exhibit 7).

⁴⁸⁷ Section 306(a), 19 U.S.C. � 2416(a).

⁴⁸⁸ Section 306(b), 19 U.S.C. � 2416(b).

⁴⁸⁹ Section 306(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. � 2416(b)(1).

⁴⁹⁰ Section 301(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. � 2411(a)(2).

⁴⁹¹ Section 306(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. � 2416(b)(1).

⁴⁹² Section 305(a)(2)(ii), 19 U.S.C. � 2415(a)(2)(ii).

⁴⁹³ See DSU Review, Discussion Paper from the European Communities dated 30 June 1999, Document No. 3864, para. 16, circulated on 1 July 1999 (US Exhibit 12).

⁴⁹⁴ The United States claims that if, in fact, the European Communities and Korea were entitled to assume, on the basis of a statutory requirement to allow the "presentation of views" on proposed determinations, that this necessarily entails publication of a list of products proposed for suspension, then they would have to conclude that Korea's laws include precisely the same requirement.  Article 4 of Korea's Foreign Trade Act (the "Act") authorizes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources to "take special measures concerning restrictions on or prohibition of the export and import of goods" if, among other reasons, the trading partner has denied Korean rights under an international convention, or if that partner imposes any "unreasonable burden or restriction" on Korean trade.  See Foreign Trade Act, http://www.oomph.net/law/html/15-13.htm (US Exhibit 20).  Article 4 of the Enforcement Decree for the Act requires the Minster of Trade and Industry to "notify publicly the contents of the measure" taken under Article 4 of the Act if the Minister "desires to take a special measure", as well when the measure is actually taken.  See Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act, http://www.oomph.net/law/html/15-9.htm (US Exhibit 21).  If anything, the Korean law is very clear in requiring publication of the specifics of its proposed measures.  No such requirement is found in Sections 301-310.

⁴⁹⁵ See e.g. Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 With Respect to Certain Canadian Practices Affecting Periodicals, 62 Fed. Reg. 50651 (1997) (US Exhibit 7); Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974: European Communities' Banana Regime, 63 Fed. Reg. 8248 (1998) (US Exhibit 15); Determination Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974: Practices of the Government of India Regarding Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemicals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29053 (1998)(US Exhibit 16).

⁴⁹⁶ Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974: Argentine Specific Duties and Non-tariff Barriers Affecting Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Other Items, 63 Fed. Reg. 25539, 25540 (1998) (US Exhibit 22)