Australia -
Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather
7.207 Australia
emphasizes that the proposition by the United States
that somehow the status or nature of a prior measure can determine the WTO
status of a new measure, (or in this case measures) has no basis in the WTO and
is without legal argument from the United States.
GATT contracting parties, and now WTO Members, bring themselves into
conformity with new rules, or after having lost disputes, by imposing new,
consistent measures. There is
nothing to suggest that losing a dispute means that suddenly a Member has less
rights than before in maintaining a WTO-consistent regime.
The idea of a penal regime where a Member was on parole in some sense
after losing a case has no legal basis. It
would be up to the United States to make a case.
The United States has lost a number of disputes in the WTO, and in none
of them has it said that that means it has to remove all measures bearing any
relationship to the inconsistent ones. Nor
has it said that its replacement measures were potentially inconsistent because
they were measures aimed at replacing those found to be inconsistent. There is
nothing in the WTO Agreement that suggests that existing measures can only be
replaced with no policy at all. Australia
makes the following additional points by way of rebuttal:
(a)
EFS and ICS do not apply to automotive leather.
(b)
Automotive leather was excised from EFS and ICS from 1 April 1997, before
the request for consultations for this Panel.
(c)
The nature and WTO status of EFS and ICS for automotive leather prior to
1 April 1997 are beyond the Panel’s terms of reference.
(d)
The nature and WTO status of EFS and ICS for products other than
automotive leather are beyond the Panel’s terms of reference.
(e)
No GATT or WTO panel has found against EFS or ICS.
(f)
Indeed, no GATT contracting party, no signatory to the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Agreement, and no WTO Member has taken Australia to a Panel on EFS and
ICS.
(g)
In the absence of a panel report finding against these schemes, it would
be highly inappropriate for this Panel to go outside its terms of reference to
examine measures that are not before the Panel and indeed do not even apply to
automotive leather. If the
United States wants a ruling on the WTO status of the two schemes, then it is
always open to it to take such a Panel. It
is not for this Panel to do the United States work outside the Panel’s terms
of reference.
7.208 Australia observes that arguments about the EFS and ICS form the major
part of the United States' case, and that it is the United States' allegations
over these schemes that represent the United States' evidence that the new
assistance also qualifies as a prohibited export subsidy.
According to Australia, the concentration on the EFS and ICS, in
circumstances where the United States has not sought to have its allegations
about these schemes addressed by a panel under the DSU, is one more example of
the United States seeking to override proper procedures in this Panel process.
For the United States to be allowed to conduct these fishing expeditions
would be another diminution of the legitimacy of the nature of WTO dispute
settlement where panels have been tightly constrained in what they look at and
on what they make findings.
7.209 Australia recalls that Article 11 of the DSU requires that the “panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case….”
The Panel needs to limit itself to the facts in relation to
subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather that are
covered in its terms of reference. These
do not include EFS and ICS. Australia
fails to understand the logic behind the United States' assertions.
Members are permitted to change their industry settings with the
obligation being that the new measures comply with their obligations.
There is nothing in the WTO that suggests that existing measures can only
be replaced with no policy at all. Australia
avers that clearly, the new arrangements were part of the outcome from the
bilateral settlement between Australia and the United States that also led to
the excision of automotive leather from the EFS and ICS.
Australia acknowledges that it
is unlikely that the grant contract and the loan contract would have been
provided in a circumstance other than the removal of automotive leather from the
EFS and ICS. However, it is too
simplistic to argue that that was the sole reason for providing them.
In particular, they were provided because of the government's
concern about regional job retention in the absence of any support for the
company in the shorter term. To
Australia, the argument by the United States that "since
the EFS and ICS were clearly export subsidies and since the new financial aid
was expressly designed to replace these benefits, the new assistance qualifies
as a prohibited export subsidy" is
a simple fallacy along the lines of: if a man has A and replaces it with B, then
B is A.
7.210 In response to the assertion by the United States that the "benefits
were provided only to Howe",
Australia states that since only one firm was involved, the arrangements were
necessarily for only one firm. This
is to state the obvious. It does
not, however, have any significance in relation to the legal status of the
measures involved.
7.211
7.212 Relying on business confidential information, the United States argues
that there was clearly a link -- which had been recognized by the Australian
government -- between the elimination of automotive leather from eligibility
under the ICS and EFS and the granting of new assistance to Howe.
7.213 Furthermore, Australia argues, the disciplines on export subsidies are in respect
of certain types of measures. This
is not a matter of how much money is provided by way of subsidy.
Where a measure is replaced by another, all that matters is whether the
new measure is consistent. Whether
the level of subsidy is lower or higher is irrelevant.
7.214 Australia submits that, while the United States said that it
was not proposing a trade effects test, it is proposing that the Panel in
reality base its findings on the following: (a)
the nature and status of prior measures; and (b) the level of exports of
Howe of automotive leather.
7.215 According to Australia, the United States exhibits purporting to show
what was in Australian Ministers’ minds at the time the new assistance
arrangements were designed do not demonstrate that what they had in mind was an
export subsidy. Indeed, to the
contrary, if the covert scenario originally implied by the United States had any
semblance of truth in it, and if Ministers thought that there was any linkage
with exports in the way suggested, it would not be credible that they would make
any statements about exports at all. Australia
provided business confidential information to the Panel concerning 1997-1998
audited sales data which, it asserts, underlines the lack of probative value of
evidence submitted by the United States regarding, for example, Howe's high
export levels.
7.216 In Australia's view, it is not credible that the United States and
Australia would have been discussing a settlement that the United States
considered to have been WTO-inconsistent. Discussions
between the United States and Australia always envisaged that it was possible to
provide WTO-consistent subsidies to Howe, but it was recognized that there was a
risk of adverse effect, in particular, serious prejudice.
The United States has not denied this.
But its arguments about prior measures and the high level of exports of
automotive leather by Howe were just as true then as now.
Australia is not saying that the United States has given Australia a
“waiver” in regard to the new assistance arrangements.
Australia would agree that in the circumstances, the United States should
not have brought this case, but Australia is not arguing here that the United
States is estopped from doing so. However,
the fact that the United States was involved in discussions with Australia over
the details of the assistance package, until at least July 1997, demonstrates
that the United States basic problem was about either the size of the loan and
grants or some other aspect of the specific arrangements.
Australia believes it is the former.
If this is the case, then instead of taking and doing the work for a
serious prejudice case, the United States is seeking to push out the boundaries
of the SCM Agreement to obtain an export level test under Part II of the SCM
Agreement. At the same time, the
United States also appears to be attempting to push out the boundary of the DSU
to obtain a prior measure test, which would have general application.
7.217 Australia asserts that, in respect of the specific arrangements, nothing
could be more anodyne than the loan, with the United States making no
substantial argument on its status. Similarly,
once the trade effects test is taken away, the allegations about the grant
contract and the payments under it also collapse.
7.218 Australia observes that the United States argues that although the United
States was indeed consulted about the new subsidies, the United States never
agreed that a new package would necessarily comply with the requirements of the
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. As
the United States recognizes, Australia never said that the United States
accepted any particular assistance arrangements.
However, the United States clearly accepted that some arrangements would
be acceptable, i.e. including being WTO consistent.
Otherwise, it would have been being duplicitous during discussions where
it sought and obtained in particular the devotion of much of the money provided
under the grant contract to investment. Now,
of course, the United States seeks to draw adverse inferences from the
allocation of money to investment.
7.219 The United
States responds that throughout Australia’s submission and in response to
written questions of the Panel, Australia states that the United States
“understood and accepted” that an alternative assistance arrangement would
be provided to producers of automotive leather.
Although the United States notes that statements or offers made during
the course of settlement discussions in a case are of no legal consequence to
the proceeding
7.221 Australia recalls that there were a large number of bilateral discussions
between the Australian and United States government
both before and after the public announcement of the new assistance arrangements
in late December 1996. These
consultations included exchanges between officials from the Australian Embassy
in Washington and USTR officials as well as direct contact between policy
officers in Canberra involved in the development of the new assistance
arrangements and officials in USTR.
7.222 According to Australia, in discussions prior to the 27 December 1996
announcement of the new assistance arrangements, USTR officials were advised of
the broad framework proposed for the alternative assistance arrangements,
including the fact that the arrangements would contain a one-off up-front grant
payment. Australia asserts that the
United States was concerned over the size of the alternative arrangements
(originally A$80 million was proposed) and the likely impact the arrangements
would have on the United States industry. This
reflected the nature of the bilateral settlement.
USTR officials made it clear immediately following the bilateral
settlement between Ambassador Barshefsky and Mr. Fischer that they would judge
the WTO-consistency or otherwise of the new scheme on whether it caused problems
or serious prejudice to the United States industry.
In response to the concerns expressed by the United States over the level
of the arrangements, the amount originally proposed was reduced markedly and the
loan element introduced.
7.223 Australia observes that, in the pre-announcement discussions on the
alternative assistance arrangements, the United States also expressed particular
concern over the proposed "up-front" payment and suggested that the
arrangements may be more acceptable if the size of this up-front payment could
be reduced and that the remainder could be paid conditionally (based mainly on
investment activity) over the next couple of years or paid as a production
warrant over the period 1April 1997 to 31 December 2000.
It was this broad payment structure that emerged in relation to the grant
contract.
7.224 Australia notes that, after the 27 December 1996 announcement of the
assistance arrangements, the bulk of the discussion between Australia and the
United States was about how to adjust the arrangements to address the concerns
of US industry.
As a result of these discussions, a number of changes were
made to the details of the arrangements. The
adjustments were made continually until the grant and loan contracts were signed
on 9 March 1997. Moreover, further
discussions, at both Ministerial and senior officials levels, continued between
Australia and the United States concerning the provisions on investment and
other details of the assistance arrangements of concern to the United States
until July 1997.
7.225 Australia underlines that the consultations on the new assistance
arrangements were extensive. They
were, of course, without prejudice to either Australia's or the United States'
WTO rights, but they do reflect that at least throughout this period the United
States accepted that alternative assistance arrangements, consistent with
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, could be provided to Howe.
Australia acknowledges that, despite these efforts, no final agreement
could be reached with the United States government
which met the concerns of the United States companies that initiated this
complaint. Australia has not
claimed that the United States ever agreed to or endorsed the assistance
arrangements eventually implemented.
7.226 According
to Australia, the panel report cited by the United
States, United States - Underwear
7.228 Australia contends that the issue between the two countries was one of
serious prejudice. If there had
been any suggestion that the United States considered that there might
potentially be a breach of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, or indeed any
other provision of the WTO, then the Australian government
would have addressed it. Instead,
there was the opposite scenario of the United States only raising the “in
fact” provision of Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement six months after binding legal domestic arrangements had
been entered into by the Australian government
and after the loan had been provided and the first two tranches of the grant
contract paid out.
7.229 In Australia's view, the record shows that Australia was concerned to
ensure WTO-consistency and, in particular, to ensure that there was no linkage
with exports. Any government that
was intent on doing something underhanded would have handled the issue quite
differently. The reported comments
on exports would, to the extent that they are accurate, simply demonstrate that
the Australian government
did not have anything in mind about linkages with export performance.
This is also borne out by the nature of the grant contract and the basis
on which actual payments were made under it.
Clearly, there was no tie to export performance.
(iii) Intent
7.230 The United States submits that the Australian government
intended the replacement package to support Howe's current and future exports.
7.231 The United States contends that the fact that the replacement package is
meant to compensate Howe for its exclusion from the ICS and EFS export
programmes is strong evidence that the true purpose of the replacement package
-- like the subsidy programmes that preceded it -- is export promotion.
Any doubts as to this fact are resolved by the numerous statements by
Australian government and Howe officials that confirm that the replacement
package is in fact tied to Howe’s actual or anticipated exportation or export
earnings. For instance, Australian
Trade Minister Tim Fischer made it clear that the purpose of the replacement
package is continued export promotion, in stating:
by dint of
effort we [the Australian government] have ensured that Howe Leather has been
able to continue its export activity over the last 18 months.
We
are working constructively with Howe Leather to ensure that they receive fair
compensation. I am determined that
this strongly performing export company should not be unfairly disadvantaged by
the agreement reached at Manila.
7.239
7.241 The United States insists that, in addition to the fact that the new
subsidies were explicitly designed to replace the forfeited de
jure export subsidies, there is strong evidence that the Australian
government intended the replacement subsidies to support Howe’s current and
future exports. There are numerous
statements by both Howe and the Australian government which confirm that the
replacement package is, in fact, tied to Howe’s actual or anticipated
exportation or export earnings.
7.242 Furthermore, the United States argues, when providing the new assistance
package to Howe, the government of Australia knew that the vast majority of
Howe’s operations were export-oriented and that additional subsidies would
serve to increase Howe’s exports. This
is clear from Howe’s long-standing participation in the ICS and EFS programmes,
the information that Howe was
obligated to provide to the government in order to obtain benefits under those
programmes and information Australia relied upon in crafting the terms of the
assistance package. Australian
government officials have acknowledged that Howe’s business is essentially an
exporting business, and the Australian media has acclaimed Howe as an Australian
exporting success story. Thus,
according to the United States, there can be no doubt that the Australian
government knew at the time it agreed to the assistance package that benefits
conferred would finance the continuation of Howe’s exports.
The fact that the replacement package was provided to promote Howe’s
exports was also recognized and welcomed by Howe itself.
7.243 Australia argues that the facts of the situation are straightforward.
In its view, automotive leather was removed from two
entitlement programmes at the request of the United States.
However, for the Australian government, politically and
socially, there was a requirement to provide some new arrangements for Howe.
Australia questions whether anyone would seriously think that Australia
would intentionally engage in a dispute with the United States in order just to
export more automotive leather. Australia
notes that it had hoped that, with the new arrangements, the matter would have
been resolved. Australia asserts
that it is the legal structure and administration of the subsidy arrangements
that should be assessed, rather than the issue of intent or the nature of any
prior measures. Australia submits
that the Panel should look at the contracts, to evaluate what they actually say
and how they are administered. Referring
to business confidential information it provided to the Panel, Australia argues
that the payments under the grant contract were not based on Howe's export
performance.
(iv)
Conditions of the assistance and the size of
the domestic market
Factors
including level of exports
7.244 The United States submits that the conditions of the replacement package
and the limited size of the domestic market demonstrate that it is in fact tied
to Howe’s export earnings. According
to the United States, to ensure that Howe would use
these funds to increase its exports, the Australian government conditioned the
grant on Howe dramatically increasing its sales, which, given the size of the
domestic market, in turn meant dramatically increasing its exports.
Howe had no choice but to continue to expand its exports in order to
obtain the full benefits offered. The
Australian government also conditioned receipt of the grant money upon Howe
undertaking A$22.8 million in approved capital investment before the year 2000.
In fact, according to the United States, Howe’s ultimate
parent, Schaffer Corp., Ltd. has admitted that the conditions of the subsidy
were tied to future exports. In its
half yearly report, Schaffer stated that the A$30 million grant was “based on
projected exports and paid on performance criteria … ” and stated that the
loan was given “to assist with the capital programme.”
7.245 The United States observes that the terms of the grant provide that Howe
will receive grant monies equal to 5 per cent of its estimated sales from April
1997 through December 2000, with a cap of A$30 million.
Thus, in order for Howe to receive the full A$30 million grant for which
it is eligible, it must generate A$600 million in sales over the life of the
replacement programme. This means
that Howe must dramatically increase its annual sales.
In 1996/97, Howe’s sales totaled approximately A$114.4 million.
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7.246
7
7.249 The United States notes that, although Australia states that the
projected demand for automobiles in Australia as calculated by the Federation of
Automotive Products Manufacturers is conservative, Australia states that it
“does not have any more up to date public forecasts to provide to the
Panel.” According to the United
States, the factual information concerning the projected demand for automobiles
in Australia presented by the United States is therefore unrebutted.
7.250 Similarly, the United
States observes that, although Australia questions the figures supplied with
regard to the projected demand for automotive leather in Australia, it does not
provide any alternative figures. The
United States notes that a panel must accept a fact submitted to establish a prima
facie case that is based upon evidence (1) which is sufficient to raise a
presumption that the alleged fact or claim is correct; and (2) that has not been
sufficiently rebutted by the opposing party.
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