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CANADA - MEASURES AFFECTING THE EXPORT
ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTION POSED BY BRAZIL
(14 February 2000)
Q1. Please confirm the United States' statement, at the 6 February Meeting of
the Panel, that it did not receive Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, dated 17
January 2000.
Response
The United States confirms the referenced statement.
ANSWERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL
(14 February 2000)
Questions to third parties
US
Q1. The US argues that the items contained in the Illustrative List are not, in
Canada's words, 'exceptions' to the rest of the SCM Agreement, but rather are
particular applications of the general standards in Article 1 to particular
types of government practices. Would the US please elaborate on this statement.
In particular, is the US suggesting that Canada's view is that the entire
Illustrative List consists of exceptions to the rest of the SCM Agreement?
Whatever the response to the preceding question, would the US disagree with a
statement that the second paragraph of item (k) might at least in some
circumstances be characterized as an "exception" to the first paragraph, in the
sense that measures defined in the first paragraph of item (k) are prohibited
export subsidies except if nevertheless they conform to the provisions of the
second paragraph?
Response
1. With respect to the Panel's request that the United States elaborate on its
statement, the question of the status of the items contained in the Illustrative
List is connected to the so-called "a contrario issue". Because the US position
regarding the latter issue has been set out more fully in its written
submissions in other dispute settlement proceedings, the United States will
restate this position below for the benefit of this Panel, and hopes that this
more detailed treatment of the issue will assist the Panel in its resolution of
the matter before it. Following that discussion, the United States will address
the other questions posed by the Panel in Question #1.
The "A Contrario" Issue
2. The basic question underlying the a contrario issue is this: In the case of a
measure that is described by a particular item of the Illustrative List, is the
measure's status as a prohibited or non-prohibited export subsidy governed by
the standards contained in the item itself or by the general standards set forth
in Article 1 and Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement? For example, in the case
of Canadian export financing under the Canada Account, if one assumes that the
type of financing in question is of a type dealt with by item (k), is the
prohibited/non-prohibited status of such financing controlled by item (k) or by
Article 1 and Article 3.1(a)?
3. In the view of the United States, as a general matter of public international
law, it is item (k) which is controlling. The principle of generalia specialibus
non derogant holds that "a matter governed by a specific provision, dealing with
it as such, is thereby taken out of the scope of the general provision dealing
with the category of subject to which that matter belongs, and which otherwise
might govern it as part of that category."1 While the Appellate Body has not
necessarily invoked this principle by name, it repeatedly has emphasized the
importance of analyzing a measure based on the provision of the WTO agreements
that most specifically addresses the measure.2 Of all the provisions in the SCM
Agreement, item (k) clearly is the provision that most specifically addresses
export credit practices.
4. In addition to general principles of public international law, the items of
the Illustrative List are controlling - where they apply - by virtue of footnote
5 of the SCM Agreement. Specifically, while Article 3.1(a) prohibits export
subsidies, including those described in the Illustrative List, footnote 5 to
Article 3.1(a) provides that "[m]easures referred to in Annex I as not
constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this or any other
provision of this Agreement." Footnote 5 makes clear that a practice identified
by the Illustrative List as not constituting an export subsidy is not prohibited
by Article 3.1(a) or any other provision of the SCM Agreement. Thus, if, for
example, an export credit practice is permitted under item (k) - rather than
prohibited - that is the end of the matter; no further analysis is needed. As
such, footnote 5 constitutes an express incorporation into the SCM Agreement of
the generalia principle.3
5. The disagreement as to whether an item of the Illustrative List is
controlling appears to focus on the word "illustrative". While all of the
parties and third parties involved in this dispute agree that the Illustrative
List is "illustrative", they disagree on the manner in which it is illustrative.
Canada and the EC appear to argue that if a particular type of financial
contribution is described by a particular item in the Illustrative List, but
cannot be considered as an export subsidy under the standard contained in the
particular item, that financial contribution nonetheless can be found to be an
export subsidy under some other standard.
6. In the view of the United States, this is not what the drafters intended when
they used the term "illustrative" to refer to Annex I of the SCM Agreement.
Instead, a more reasonable interpretation is that the drafters used the term
"illustrative" simply to signify that not all types of financial contributions
are covered by the Illustrative List.4 However, where an item of the Illustrative
List does address a particular type of financial contribution - as is the case
with respect to item (k) and export credits - that item sets forth the standard
for determining whether the financial contribution is or is not an export
subsidy.
7. Consider, for example, item (j) of the Illustrative List, which deals with
export guarantee and insurance programmes. Looking just at the standard for
premium rates, premium rates give rise to an export subsidy if they are
"inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes."
Implicit in item (j), however, is the notion that premium rates do not give rise
to an export subsidy if they are "adequate" to cover long-term operating costs
and losses. Thus, on its face, item (j) provides Members with a predictable
standard to use in establishing and administering export guarantee and insurance
programmes.
8. Under the approach to the Illustrative List taken by Canada and the EC,
however, any predictability is lost. For example, if item (j) was only
"illustrative", there would be numerous ways in which an export insurance or
guarantee programme could be considered to be an export subsidy even though the
premium rates conform to the standard in item (j). If premium rates were
inadequate to cover short-term operating costs or losses, a programme could be
considered to be an export subsidy. If premium rates were inadequate to cover
short- or long-term non-operating costs, a programme could be considered to be
an export subsidy. If premium rates were less than what an exporter might pay
for comparable coverage in the marketplace, there could be an export subsidy
under a "benefit to recipient" approach. This would be particularly true in a
situation where a specific export transaction involves an unusually severe risk
of nonpayment or currency fluctuation.5
9. It is extremely unlikely that the drafters of the SCM Agreement went to the
trouble of crafting in the Illustrative List specific and detailed rules for
particular types of financial contributions, such as the rules in item (j) and
item (k), with the intent that those rules could be readily ignored in favor of
more general standards found elsewhere in the SCM Agreement. Instead, a more
plausible reading is that the drafters intended to use the Illustrative List as
a vehicle for establishing detailed rules for certain types of financial
contributions, rules that elaborate on the general principles contained in
Article 1 but that cannot be ignored in favor of those more general principles.
10. The counter-arguments that have been made against this interpretation are
not persuasive. For example, the EC has argued that in order for footnote 5 to
exclude a measure from the prohibitions of the SCM Agreement, there has to be "a
clear statement in Annex I that a measure does not constitute an export
subsidy."6 In its prior submissions to the Appellate Body on this issue, the EC
stated that "footnote 5 requires an 'affirmative statement' in the Illustrative
List to the effect that a measure does not constitute an export subsidy.7 Under
either standard, the EC has identified only the second paragraph of item (k) as
falling within the purview of footnote 5.8
11. However, the text of footnote 5 does not require such a "clear" or
"affirmative" statement, and there is a reason for this: the drafters had a
different intent. Footnote 5 first appeared in the third draft agreement
prepared by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Subsidies.9 In this draft,
footnote 5 appeared for the first time - as footnote 4 to Article 3.1(a).
Footnote 4 read as follows: "Measures expressly referred to in the Illustrative
List as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this or
any other provision of this Agreement." (Emphasis added). Thus, the original
version of footnote 5 had an additional word - "expressly" - which, had it been
retained, might have supported the EC interpretation.
12. The word "expressly" was not retained, however. In the very next draft, the
word was deleted from the footnote (still numbered as footnote 4).10 This change
demonstrates that the drafters intended to expand, rather than restrict, the
scope of footnote 5.11 The change also demonstrates that the drafters did not
intend the sort of narrow construction of footnote 5 advanced by the EC.
13. The second principal argument - advanced by both Canada and the EC - is that
the US interpretation somehow would transform the Illustrative List into an
exhaustive list that allegedly would allow "all sorts of measures" to escape the
export subsidy prohibition.12 Both Canada and the EC have offered as an example
item (a) of the Illustrative List, which prohibits "direct subsidies," claiming
that under the US approach, indirect export subsidies would escape item (a) and,
thus, prohibition under Article 3.1(a).13
14. However, this is a mischaracterization of the US position. First, as noted
above, the US position is not that the Illustrative List is exhaustive. Instead,
the US position is that the Illustrative List does not deal with all possible
financial contributions, but for those that it does deal with, it establishes,
by virtue of footnote 5, a dispositive legal standard insofar as prohibited
subsidies are concerned. Second, in the case of the EC's item (a) example, the
US position is that item (a) simply does not address "indirect" subsidies. Thus,
indirect subsidies do not "escape" any prohibition. Instead, the standard for a
prohibited indirect subsidy must either be found elsewhere in the Illustrative
List or, if the specific provisions of the Illustrative List are silent, in the
general principles of Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
15. Finally, the opponents of the a contrario interpretation have never been
able to explain how their approach to footnote 5 and the Illustrative List does
not render various portions of the Illustrative List ineffective. For example,
they have been unable to explain how their approach does not render the
"material advantage" clause of item (k) superfluous. Because such an outcome is
incorrect under public international law,14 a correct interpretation of footnote 5
and the Illustrative List is that the provisions of the Illustrative List are
controlling with respect to the measures addressed therein.
Canada's View
16. Canada's view appears to be that footnote 5, as well as any item in the
Illustrative List that - in Canada's view - is encompassed by footnote 5, is an
exception to Article 3.15 In the view of the United States, neither footnote 5 nor
the items in the Illustrative List constitute "exceptions". To the contrary,
footnote 5 and the Illustrative List are part of Article 3, not exceptions to
it.
The Second Paragraph of Item (k)
17. Whether one considers the second paragraph of item (k) to be an "exception
to", a "qualification of", or a "refinement of" the first paragraph is, in the
view of the United States, essentially a semantic exercise with no legal
significance. The Appellate Body has stated that the assignment of the burden of
proof is not affected by describing a particular provision as an "exception" to
something else.16 Likewise, characterizing a provision as an "exception" does not
affect the interpretation of the provision. As the Appellate Body has stated:
[M]erely characterizing a treaty provision as an "exception" does not by itself
justify a "stricter" or "narrower" interpretation of that provision than would
be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words,
viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in
other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation.17
18. Thus, whether or not one characterizes the second paragraph of item (k) as
an exception to the first paragraph, the complainant in a dispute - in this
case, Brazil - has the burden of proving that the alleged offending practice
fails to satisfy the terms of the second paragraph.
Q2. In any case, what are the practical implications, if any, for the issues
before the Panel (and for the parties' arguments) of the US argument concerning
the parties' characterizations of the Illustrative List (or at least of the
second paragraph of item (k) thereof)? That is, the parties seem to agree that
it would be for Canada eventually to choose whether to invoke that provision as
a defense, and if it did so, to provide evidence to demonstrate its compliance
therewith. Does the US agree or disagree with this? Please explain.
Response
1. The practical implications of the US argument depend upon whether the Panel
considers itself bound by an agreement between the two parties as to how the SCM
Agreement should be interpreted; i.e., the parties' agreement that Canada bears
the burden of proving that Canada Account financing now conforms to the second
paragraph of item (k). If the Panel simply decides that it will accept the
parties' interpretation because it happens to be something on which they agree,
then the US argument is irrelevant.
2. However, in the view of the United States, a panel is not obliged to accept
the interpretation of an agreement that happens to be shared by the two
litigants present before it. Although it is true that WTO dispute settlement is
a Member-driven process, that does not mean that a panel can ignore its mandate
under Article 11 of the DSU to "make an objective assessment of the matter
before it ... ."
3. Thus, the United States believes that the Panel must interpret the SCM
Agreement objectively and independently of any agreement between the parties.
When it does so, the United States believes that it should interpret the SCM
Agreement - and, in particular, item (k) - in the manner described by the United
States in its response to Question #1. Such an interpretation leads to the
conclusion that the burden is on Brazil to demonstrate that the Canada Account
does not conform to the second paragraph of item (k).
Q3. Concerning the verification mechanism proposed by Canada, the US argument
seems to be that were the Panel to endorse any such mechanism, this would
constitute a violation of Article 19.1 of the DSU, in that it would constitute a
"modification" thereof which the Appellate Body has ruled is impermissible. Is
this a correct understanding of the US argument. Please elaborate.
Response
1. The Panel's understanding is correct. Under the DSU, panels may suggest
methods of implementation, not methods of monitoring implementation.
Surveillance of implementation is the subject of other provisions of the DSU,
not Article 19.
RESPONSES BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL AND
FROM BRAZIL
(14 February 2000)
Question 1 to the EC
The EC takes the view that because Canada has "undertaken" to respect all the
provisions of the OECD Arrangement, Canada has prima facie correctly implemented
the Panel's findings. Would the EC please elaborate on what it means by
"undertaken". That is, is the EC's position dependent on the specific nature of
characteristics of that undertaking, and if so, what are the elements that
persuade the EC that the undertaking does constitute prima facie correct
implementation? Under what circumstances, if any, would the EC consider that a
statement issued by a government body, or made by a government employee acting
in an official capacity, did not have the status of an undertaking constituting
prima facie evidence of compliance with a ruling by the DSB ?
Response
1. The EC did not use the term "undertaken" to suggest that Canada had entered
into a binding commitment. Canada has rather declared that it will not in future
approve Canada Account financing "which does not comply with the OECD
Arrangement."1
2. In the original proceeding, the Panel took the view that since Canada Account
financing was discretionary, it could only rule on particular cases of support.2
This finding was not challenged on appeal. As a result, the Panel merely found a
number of transactions to have been de jure export contingent.
3. There is not therefore any finding of an export subsidy programme to
implement although Canada has taken some steps to ensure that the programme will
not in future give rise to the same problems.
4. There is a change in Canada's practice on Canada Account financing since
before the declaration it claimed that this financing was "consistent" with the
OECD Arrangement, which can be taken simply to mean that Canada did not consider
that Canada Account financing fell under the OECD Arrangement. Now, it
positively declares that future Canada Account financing will comply with the
Arrangement.
5. But this is not really the question before the Panel. If it was not possible
in the original proceeding to declare the Canada Account financing incompatible
with the SCM Agreement as a programme, that is in general, because it was
discretionary, then it is still not possible now. The existence of the Panel
Report cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members (Article
3.2 DSU).
Question 2 to the EC
Would the EC please elaborate on the specific reasons why it does not believe
that it would be appropriate for the Panel to suggest a transparency agreement,
as proposed by Canada. In
particular, does the EC consider that such a suggestion by the Panel would be
impermissible under the DSU and/or the SCM Agreement, or simply inadvisable for
other reason? Please explain.
Response
1. The EC finds itself in agreement with the statement of the US that Article
19.1 DSU, by its plain terms, allows a panel to suggest ways of implementing the
recommendations that it makes after concluding that a measure is inconsistent
with the covered agreement. A transparency agreement is not capable in itself to
achieve the result of bringing Canada's subsidies into conformity. It is rather
a means of verifying compliance, which is not a matter in which panels should
become involved.
2. Accordingly, Article 19.1 DSU does not give to the Panel the necessary
authority to make the suggestion and it is therefore impermissible.
QUESTION FROM BRAZIL
Brazil notes several references to its Rebuttal Submission, dated 17 January
2000, in the European Communities' Statement for the Meeting of the Panel on 6
February 2000. Please identify from whom the European Communities received this
document.
Response
1. The European Communities received Brazil's second written submission by
e-mail. No record of the origin of the transmission was kept. It expected to
have received the text from Brazil.
2. The European Communities is concerned that Brazil contests its right of have
received the second submission and states that it did declined to send a copy to
the EC as required by the Working Procedures of the Panel. How can the EC
usefully contribute to the consideration of this matter by the Panel if it is
not aware of all the arguments that have been presented to the Panel prior to
the meeting?
3. Article 10:3 of the Understanding on Rules and procedures governing the
settlement of disputes (DSU) states that :
4. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the Parties to the dispute to
the first meeting of the Panel. (emphasis added).
5. Furthermore, the DSU does not foresee any specificity in the application of
this rule to panels reconvened pursuant to Article 21.5.
6. As the meeting of 6 February 2000 was the first and only meeting of the Panel
in this case, the EC was entitled to receive all submissions made to that
meeting.
7. A refusal by Brazil to allow the EC to have its second written submission
would be a breach of the DSU and the Working Procedures an undermine the
validity of the procedure.
8. The European Communities can assure Brazil that there has been no breach of
confidentiality since its second written submission has only been made available
to Members participating in the proceeding and for that purpose, as required by
the DSU.
1 Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Court
of International Justice, 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points,
1957 British Y.B. Int'l L. 236; see also Case Concerning Payment of Serbian
Loans, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 20/21, page 30; and Grotius, De Iure Belli Ac
Pacis, Lib. II, Cap. XVI, XXIX (Classics, 3, 1929). Likewise, one is "not entitled to assume that the disappearance [of "expressly"] was merely accidental or an inadvertent oversight on the part of either harassed negotiators or inattentive draftsmen." United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body adopted 25 February 1997, page 17. The negotiating record demonstrates that after the word "expressly" was deleted from the text, footnote 5 - then footnote 4 - continued to be the subject of discussion, including an unsuccessful attempt to delete the footnote altogether. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Meeting of 6 November 1990: Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG10/24 (29 November 1990), page 2.
12 FSC, para. 4.933.
1
Paragraph 57 of Canada's First Written Submission.
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